WIREDU’S CONCEPTION OF ‘CULTURE’ IN AN AFRICAN MODERNITY.
1.0.
INTRODUCTION.
This paper is a response
to Wiredu’s conception of “Culture” in An African Modernity. This response is
fundamentally based on a thorough reading, understanding and examination of his
claims and arguments presented in his two essays: one entitled: Custom and Morality: A comparative analysis
of Some African and Western Conceptions of Morals” and another entitled: “Are there cultural universals”. In
brief, in the essay “custom and Morality” Wiredu is advancing three theses.
Firstly, Wiredu is arguing for Universal ethics, secondly he offers a
comprehensive response two important theses in African philosophy; the
opposites theses of communalism and individualism. On this, Wiredu is not
tilling a virgin ground but rather continuing the work of his predecessors
namely Leopold Senghor, Nyasani, Gykye and John Mbiti as well as other
ethnophilosophers who tackled the problem of communalism when African
philosophy was in its foundational phase. The third problem, which he considers
in the essay, is the impact of non-African ethical modes on the African
society. On this third problem, Wiredu argues that the modernisation of African
society has had some impacts on the African culture. According to Wiredu, most
of these impacts are negative as can be demonstrated in the opening of the
essay where Wiredu argues, “The African today lives in a cultural flux
characterised by a confused interplay between indigenous cultural heritage and
a foreign cultural legacy of colonialism”. Worse still, the cultural amalgam
has led to the imposition of the Western conceptions of the good upon African
thought and conduct. According to
Wiredu’s most of these problems is traceable to colonialism. It is from this
background that Wiredu conceives “Culture” in an African Modernity as falling
short of identity and authenticity.
On the other
hand, the essay “Are there cultural
Universals” is a systematic defence of the view that despite the problem of
the Babel of languages and difficulties in translation, people of different
cultures can still communicate with one another. This presupposes the existence
of some fundamental rules that unify us as human beings, morality being one of
those rules. In this essay, Wiredu also gives a powerful analysis of culture.
He argues that the term culture can be understood in two different senses. In
its ordinary sense, “Culture” can be conceived as the social forms and the
customary beliefs and practices of a human group. However, from a philosophical
discourse “culture” is not just the social forms and customary beliefs and
practices of a human group since these phenomena also depend on the existence
of language, knowledge, communication, interaction and the methods knowledge transmission to the born and the
unborn, and according to Wiredu this is the fundamental sense of the term
“Culture” (Wiredu, 1986:36).
This paper
therefore capitalises on the two readings, though largely on the essay of
“Custom and Morality” in order to respond to the claims which Wiredu advances.
In particular, the paper will discuss Wiredu’s general conception of culture in
pre modern Africa and his conception of
“Culture” in African modernity. Communalism and individualism are to be
discussed thoroughly, since it is on these two opposing theses where Wiredu
bases his arguments and claims. The paper will also critically discuss the
concepts of morality and custom. These two are fundamental in Wiredu’s analysis
and conception of Culture in an African Modernity. A thorough exposition will
also be given to the notion of Modernity, as this is vital to the question at
hand. Lastly and most importantly, a critical response will be made on the claims
made by Wiredu on the concept of “Culture” in an Africa
modernity.
2.0.WIREDU’S
GENERAL CONCEPT OF CULTURE.
Generally, the
term “culture” is used to refer to a particular society at a particular time
and space. It may also refer to the attitudes and behaviour that are
characteristic of a particular social group or organization.Wiredu uses the
concept of culture to boundary, says that the life in any society not
politically organised is what he calls culture. Any society, which has no
political organisation, is held together by the principles of culture, which
may include traditions, customs and morals.
Technically,
Wiredu understands culture in two different senses. Firstly, according to
Wiredu “Culture” in the ordinary sense is conceived as the “social forms and
customary beliefs and practices of a human group” (Wiredu, 1986: 36). He
further proceed, stating that though this is not the fundamental way of
conceiving “Culture”, nevertheless it is one of the acceptable way of doing so
and the most frequent in non-philosophical discourse. However, this
understanding of culture gives birth to doubts about the existence of cultural
Universals, which are universal rules that cultures share or general rules that
enables people to link one idea with another between cultures. Understanding
culture in the ordinary sense, however it to be humanly contingent, not humanly
necessary.
From a broader
perspective, culture is not understood as only the social forms and customary
beliefs and practices. These aspects also depend of the existences of other
variables namely: language, knowledge, communication, interaction the methods
of knowledge acquisition (Wiredu 36). This is the fundamental sense of the word
“culture”. It is this understanding of culture, which renders the existence of
cultural universals plausible.
2.1. WIREDU’S
THREE ASPECTS OF CULTURE
According to
Wiredu, culture governs human behaviour. It is because of the element of
culture that is habit, instruction and conscious thought, that we have
differences between people. Thus, habit, instruction and conscious thought are
the main aspects of culture. On habit, Wiredu asserts that to understand
culture in such a way is unhelpful because culture is supposed to be dynamic
not static, changing with space and time. In other words, culture is something,
which is evolving. Therefore, culture is not necessarily a habit. On the notion
of cultural change, Wiredu in the essay “Problems
in Africa’s Self-Definition in the
Contemporary World” distinguishes three types of cultural change: firstly,
there is a change that is deliberate and self initiated- this change
substitutes something original for an old cultural element. In this, a cultural
value is substituted with something emanating within the culture itself. The
second change is a kind of change that is deliberate but it involves
substituting a cultural value with something foreign. The last change is the
one, which is neither self-initiated nor original in its replacement. Wiredu
considers this as the most problematic as it causes severe subverted identity
and this the condition of modern Africa. Their
colonial mentality makes them overvalue foreign things coming from the colonial
masters. Wiredu emphasises that “things” in this case is to be interpreted
widely to include not only material but also western modes of thought and
behaviour. It is from the same background that Frantz Fanon advocates for what
he calls “epistemological decolonisation”
to retain the identity and authenticity of an African person, because in
modern Africa, the African person has lost his
selfhood by adopting western modes of thought and existence. When Wiredu
examine culture in an African Modernity, he places the above-mentioned effects
as a centre of his concern and the central point of analysis.
Furthermore,
Wiredu argues that Culture is also something that can be learnt and talked.
However, the problem with this is that it is difficult to determine the
contents of the lessons on culture. One of the fundamental problems is the case
where one culture is assimilated into other cultures. Lastly, culture should be
understood as conscious thought and speech. Culture therefore is not a routine.
3.0.MODERNITY
AND AFRICAN CULTURE.
Modernity is
understood to encompass three things: industrialisation, communication as well
as commerce and trade. Therefore, though Wiredu does not define what modernity
is, still we can infer form the readings that modernity is manifested in the
coming of colonialism, which helped in the transformation of the rural areas
into urban through the process of industrialisation. This was accompanied by
the introduction of Christianity, which further led to the introduction of a “new
morality” based on the Bible and Christian ethics, in general. Colonisation
brought into Africa a western culture. The
advent of this western culture changed people’s outlook drastically.
Colonisation devoured the African native cultures and left out a culture whose
identity and authenticity is deformed and left the people in the urban
mimicking the westerners blindly. In
order to fully capture the influence of modernity on the African culture,
Wiredu draws several examples of moral decay mostly drawn from the Akan society
in Nigeria.
These include cases of rising levels of corruption and crime. It is from these
inferences that Wiredu applies his conclusions to the whole of African
continent.
Wiredu argues
that the indigenous cultural heritage draws much on modernity. There is a
conflict between modernity and tradition. Tradition is weaker while modernity
is stronger. Due to this scenario, there is a superimposition of conduct on the
native African and this superimposition is being fuelled by the process of
urbanisation, in which rural areas are fast transforming into towns.
However before
we consider or cite such examples, it is necessary to consider Wiredu’s
treatment of Morality and custom as well as his treatment of the two opposing
theses of communalism and individualism since these have a large bearing on the
main concerns on his Conception of Culture in an African Modernity.
3.1 MORALITY AND
CUSTOM
Wiredus’s
treatment of Morality and custom is aimed at demonstrating the significance of
Morality over custom and overall to demonstrate that that there is a Universal
morality among the cultures and morality is one element of culture that is
universal. He achieves this in different ways.
Firstly, he
argues that, unlike Custom, Morality is intrinsically obligatory. Moral rules
are obligatory in themselves. Morality has rules that transcend not only space,
but also time. Thus, moral rules can do the ethical organisation of a society
because of this quality. To demonstrate this intrinsic obligatoriness of moral
rules Wiredu gives two examples drawn from the Akan society. He argues that
among the Akan, a considerable value is attached to the beauty of speech and
the possession of such a quality is seen as a qualification in the traditional
courts. Within the same Akan society there are also rules pertaining to
greetings. Failure to observe such rules is seen as a serious offence.
However, Wiredu
argues that such rules are motivated by values, which are not universal. This
means these rules, though accorded such value in the Akan Society are of less
value and significance or no value at all in other societies. Therefore, the
principles of evaluating customs unlike those used in the evaluation of
morality are relative to specific social organisations (Wiredu, 19986:36). Thus, customs encompasses things as
traditions, manners, conventions, grammars, vocabularies taboos and mores and
they are not universally valid principles. The wrongness or the rightness or
rather the propriety and impropriety of these customs is cultural relative
(Wiredu, 1986:36). On the other hand, Wiredu says whether you a Ghanaian or an
American or any individual of any other nationality culture, race or
nationality, truth telling is an Unconditional obligation. This is a clear
demarcation between rules, which are a matter of custom, and those, which are a
matter of morals. The Akan rules of the beauty of speech and the rules of
greeting are just a matter of custom and not a matter of morality. Thus, though
some customs are obligatory, the nature of the obligatoriness of a custom is
often or even always relative to a specific culture, society and grouping. Nevertheless,
despite the lack of intrinsic obligatoriness in customs, this does not render
customs absolute. Wiredu is quick on this, arguing that “This insistence on the
separation in thought between custom and morality does not assuredly, carry any
suggestion that customs cannot form a basis for discrimination of the good and
the bad indifferent” (Wiredu, 1986:39). Customs therefore supplements morals in
maintaining the good of the people.
The second
important characteristic of Moral rules as compared to customs is that, a moral
rule is unconditional-it is not contingent. A moral rule is unconditional
because the exclusion of it could lead to human suffering. In Wiredu’s
phraseology, “A rule of conduct is not a moral rule unless its non-existence or
reversal would bring the collapse of human suffering (Wiredu, 2:63). A good
example is to imagine a society where the rule of truth telling was to be
reversed. That, circumstance would lead to the fall of that community. In such
a community, to borrow Hobbes Jargon, as Wiredu does life would be “solitary,
poor, nasty brutish” and probably short (Wiredu, 1986:36). Therefore,
consistency is the necessary condition for a moral rule, for without it, the
human society can be at risk.
Moreover, the
rationale of any moral rule is the harmonisation of the interests of the
individual with the interests of others in the society (Wiredu, 1995:64). What
is central in morality is the problem arising from the fact that not every
human being is concern with others interests, others human beings persistently
and constantly advance their own interests. It is in consideration of this
egoistic nature of human beings that an imperative arises, which Wiredu
emulates from the Kantian ethics of deontology asserting, “Let your conduct at
all times manifest a due concern for the interests of others”. This is what
Wiredu terms as the “principle of
sympathetic impartiality” (Wiredu1986:37). Morality, unlike custom, from
the standpoint of conduct is the motivated pursuit of sympathetic impartiality.
The principle of sympathetic impartiality carries such values as truthfulness,
honesty, justice, chastity that does not vary from culture to culture. It is
this principle that makes morality universal.
4.0 CULTURE IN
AFRICAN MODERNITY: COMMUNALISM AND INDIVIDUALISM.
Wiredu’s
conception of modernity is closely linked to two opposite modes of existence in
traditional African society: Communalism and Individualism. Wiredu links
communalism with Morality asserting that Morality involves the harmonisation of
interests. Therefore, communalism as a thesis is more capable of harmonising
the interests of the individual with those of the community. Modernity, which
has come about because of urbanisation via industrialisation, has had negative
impacts of the African traditional communal life. This is why Wiredu
concentrate much discussing the effects of modernity on traditional culture.
However, it is also worthy noting that communalism as opposed to individualism
is a contested theme in African philosophy. Most African Philosophers starting
from Senghor, Nyasani, Gykye, Mbiti, and Wiredu considers the African modes of
existence at initial stages prior to colonialism or modernisation as
communalistic. Several writings of ethnophilosophers may support this claim.
To begin with,
in advancing the communality thesis Augustine Shutte asserted that “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” meaning a
person is a person through other persons (Shutte 1993:460). This traditional
African aphorism articulates a basic respect and compassion for others. The
community in this sense empowers and inculcates personness. Augmenting this,
Nyasani (1997 in Lassiter 1999), states that the African individual hardly
knows how to act outside the context of his community prescriptions. For, Nyasani
the existence of the individual in African society is “quasi dissolution” into
the reality of others for the sake of individuals’ existence. Fundamentally,
Mbiti who did a vast research on communalism of the African continent provides
a powerful thesis of communalism, which captures Wiredu’s idea on the
same.Mbiti states that the individual has little latitude for self-determination
outside the context of the traditional African family and community. Quoting
him verbatim, he says that:
“Whatever
happens to the individual happens to the whole group and whatever happens to
the whole group happens to the individual. The individual can only say ‘I am
because we are and since we are therefore I am’. This is the cardinal point of
understanding of the African view of man (Mbiti 1969:109).
Thus, in
communal society the individual has a strong attachment to the members and
hence has more fundamental duties and responsibilities to fulfil. Kwasi Gykye
captures this point arguing that it is from this combined sense of personhood
and communal membership that the family and community expect individuals to
take personal enhancing and socially responsible decisions and actions
(1988:31-32). In communal setting therefore, there is a full manifestation of
the notion of morality as the harmonisation of interests and full manifestation
of personness as one endowed with social duties and responsibilities, not one
perusing particular ends. Unlike in individualistic societies, the individual
in the communal setting is motivated by the supreme law of morality of “sympathetic
impartiality” (Wiredu 1986:37), with this principle, an individuals ends are in
accord with communal ends; in pursuance of the particular ends the individual
achieves the common good. The notion of communalism as advanced by Wiredu may
therefore be liken to Rousseau’s General will, in which genuine freedom is
manifested when the particular ends of the individual meet the common good of
the society. Wiredu feels that modernity has dissolved these benefits of communal
life in the urban Africa.
Firstly,
modernity has replaced communalism with individualism. Wiredu argues that
industrialisation leading to urbanisation has brought a bent in the Akan
ethics. The word “communalistic” itself might be used to characterise the bent
of that ethic. The outlook of morality in an African modernity, specifically in
Akan society is defined in terms of the adjustments of the interests of society
to those of the individual, which is a characteristic of individualism
(wiredu1995:71). This individualism has hazardous effects on morality. Wiredu
observes that communalistic orientation can provide an added incentive to the
moral motivation. On the contrary, “the apparent concomitants of
industrialisation are eroding this mechanism for the enforcement of morals”
(Wiredu 1995:71)
Furthermore,
because of urbanisation, city dwellers do not have the benefits of the support
or the sanctions of the systems of caring that were a characteristic of the
traditional community life. Consequently, they lack the sympathetic impartiality,
which is the principle moral virtue. The Africans living in the urban cities
lacks the rights and privileges that originated from the household relations of
kingships, which in turn provided a natural school for the training in the
practices of sympathetic impartiality, which is the root of all moral virtue. Most
importantly, drawing from the foregoing discussion, Wiredu argues and concludes
that the urban is a false community in which individuals are heaped together by
circumstances of industry, but are morally loosely connected to each other.
Their bond is consumption and the individuals are void of solidarity and social
obligations.
The individual
in an African modernity lacks social responsibility, contrary to the fundament
principle of personhood in traditional community where “a person is not just an
individual of human parentage, but also one evincing in her projects and
achievements and adequate sense of social responsibility”(Wiredu1995:71). The
actions of individuals in the cities are only motivated by human sympathy, not
the principle of sympathetic impartiality, which Wiredu considers the
fundamental law of morality. Wiredu Strongly argues that, “Bereft of the
traditional underpinnings, of this sense of responsibility, the city dweller is
left with nothing but his basic sense of human sympathy” (Wiredu 1986:32)). He
proceeds arguing that it is because of the lack of sympathetic impartiality and
lack of sanctions that were a feature of the traditional community that we see
an increase in crime in the cities. This scenario comes about because the
individual in the urban advances his own interests, thus, the principle of
morality as a harmonisation of interests has lost its value and has been
rendered absolute.
He further
argues that mostly industrialisation seems to prove to be disastrous to the
system of communalism that characterised by care and solidarity which was
typical of traditional Africa. For Wiredu,
industrialisation is the destroyer of communal Africa.
This however does not entail that industrialisation is bad in its totality;
industrialisation has brought some positive things. The challenge for Wiredu therefore is to find
the means of reaping the fruits of this modernisation while discarding its negative
effects. The argument is that, as Africa
modernises the claim to communal life becomes weaker and weaker. Communalism is
under threat by modernity.
5.0.A
RESPONSE TO WIREDU’S CONCEPT OF CULTURE IN AN AFRICAN MODERNITY
To begin with,
Wiredu claims that modernity, which has come because of industrialisation, has
destroyed the communal life of traditional Africa.
To this claim, one may argue that even though communal life has been destroyed
by industrialisation, the changes are not hazardous. This argument rests on
Wiredu’s understanding of Morality. Somewhere else in this paper Wiredu has
stipulated that Morality is intrinsically obligatoriness and unconditional.
Morality is universal and is not relative to any culture or environment.
Morality is also more fundamental than customs that is in terms of significance
and value. Therefore, whether one lives in the traditional or urban setting it
makes no difference at all, as far as morality is concern. Therefore, a move
from the pre modern to the urban does not involve any change of morality, but
rather a change in custom, which to Wiredu has a lesser significance and value.
Wiredu even states, “[T]he real difference between communalism and
individualism has to do with custom” (Wiredu1995:72). Therefore, one may question
the foundation of Wiredu’s concern, because a shift from the traditional to the
urban causes no any moral decay, - that is if we hold Wiredu conception and
attributes of morality.
Secondly, Wiredu
has argued that the urban is a false community, which natures “Homo economicus”
lumped together by the circumstances of industry and are loosely connected to
each other. On this, Wiredu assumes that individuals are driven by same
interests and motives at all circumstances and environment. It is therefore worth
pointing out that an individual needs and interests changes with time and
space. The main moderating variable being the changes in environment, which
forces an individual to find alternative means of subsistence. Therefore, to
label the urban as a false community and view the urban individual as a “Homo
economicus” motivated by circumstances of industry is tantamount to a static
view of life, discarding the dynamism of it. The traditional community dweller
has needs different to those of the urban dweller. To judge the urban life,
based on standards of traditional community or rural life is tantamount to the
imposition of the western categories on the African culture. Therefore, the
urban community is authentic just as the traditional community is, and both
have to be judged independent of the other.
Wiredu further
claimed that an individual in the urban lacks responsibility and there is no
solidarity because the individuals are only motivated by human sympathy and not
sympathetic impartiality. In other words, the relations between individuals in
the urban are not genuine unlike those in the traditional community. On this,
it is worth noting that the individuals in the communal setting are attached to
other by the bonds of kingship. Considering this, it is sceptical as to whether
their actions are motivated by pure human concern or the kingship attachments.
The point am advancing is that, the urban individual actions are the ones that
may be said to be motivated by human concern, because despite that these people
have no any kinship relations are able to accord to each other the human
sympathy and dignity, though as Wiredu argues, this is motivated by the
circumstances of industry.
Wiredu also
argues that the individuals in the urban are motivated by selfish ends. This
arises from the fact that individualism calls for the adjustment of society
interests to those of an individual and not the individual adjusting his
interests to those of the society. However, it is worth again to point out that
individuals in any social setting are also egoistic not always altruistic as
Wiredu may appeal to us. The individual in a traditional community has few
needs than in an urban setting. Therefore, it is easy for community dwellers to
have a common goal since their particular needs are not different from the
common needs. Overall, even in a situation where one acts in conformity with
the interests of others, still a degree of egoism is attached, because the
individual in such a situation fears that if he fails to consider the interests
of others in his endeavours, his colleagues will follow suit. Therefore, the
actions of individuals, whether in communalistic or individualistic societies, are
motivated by selfishness only that in individualistic society the egoism is clear
while in communalistic society it is disguised as social responsibility. Wiredu
partly accepts this when states,
“[The]
distinction between communalism and individualism is one of degree only; for a
considerable value may be attached to communality in individualistic societies
just as individuality is not necessarily trivialised within communalism…[The]
two orientations can coexist in different sectors of the same society (Wiredu
1995:76).
From this, one
can argue that even in industrial Africa there
is a communal culture operating some sectors.
Additionally, it
seems Wiredu lacks consistency in his argumentation and presentation of facts.
He mentions that difference between communalism and individualism has to do
with custom and lifestyle. This entails that the morality of urban dwellers and
communal dwellers is similar. Sparingly, when Wiredu talks of the increase in
crime in industrial Africa he alludes to the
claim that relations in industrial are not motivated by the principle of
sympathetic impartiality, which is the supreme moral virtue. This presupposes
that industrial Africa has no morals, yet he
said these moral are universal in any environ. This is a contraction, because
it means the difference between communalism and individualism is not only on
custom as he first presented but also on morality.
Moreover, even
though Wiredu put much of the blame on industrialisation and modernity on the
withering of communal life, it can be argued that modernisation is any society,
no matter how primitive it may be, is both inevitable and necessary. In talking
of modernity, Wiredu often times refers to the coming of Westerners and
implicitly regards them as the perpetrators of modernity, which has affected
communal Africa. However, even without the
coming of the foreigners, still Africa would
have modernised with the time and the changes affecting communal life would
have occurred. Therefore, to blame modernity is to implicitly advocate for a
non-progressive, static society. The main concern for Wiredu should be finding
strategies on how Africa can modernise without
losing the fabric of its culture.
Wiredu also
tackled the problem of crime, stating that African modernity experiences an
increase in the rate of crime as compared to traditional Africa,
to the extent that in his analysis of this problem he leaves room for one to
assume that before modernity there were no crimes. This increase in crime,
according to Wiredu is due to the discarding of the principle of sympathetic
impartiality, which is the fundamental law of morality. This claim, though
sound to some extent is not a necessary explanation. Population increase can be
attributed to this increase in crime rate. In pre-modern Africa,
recourses were abundant such that there was no competition on the means of
subsistence. However, with the population explosion some people do no have the
necessary means for earning a living. As a result, there is competition for
resources, and this gives rise to theft and other crimes. Fundamentally, the
existence of criminals in town is a clear demonstration that there were also
potential criminals in the traditional community, since they are the same
people from traditional communities who line in urban cities.
Nevertheless,
though the explanation that Wiredu gives is not sufficient to justify, the
increase in crime rate, largely I would agree with the Wireduean thesis. Most
of the crimes in the urban indeed are motivated by the desire to acquire false needs;
these are needs not basic to human survival, like televisions, expensive cars
and mobile phones. A critical theorist, Herbert Marcuse captures Wiredu’s
concern stating that, the advanced industrial society has created false needs,
which integrate the individual into the existing systems of production and
consumption via mass media and contemporary modes of thought. This, argues
Marcuse, results into a “one dimensional”
universe of thought and behaviour in which the aptitude and ability for
critical thought wither away. In this modernity, Marcuse concurs with Wiredu, individuals
are searching for social connections through material items.
The last
argument that can be levelled against Wiredu concerns the methodology of his
research. Wiredu’s research was done only in Nigeria and particularly among the
Akan tribe. It is from the findings of that limited research that Wiredu draws
several conclusions. These conclusions are then applied to the entire African
continent. Much as one can conceive the results or effects of modernity to be
universal in all societies, yet one should not rule out the fact that different
cultures resist or adapt to foreign influences differently. It is therefore
fallacious for Wiredu to draw sweeping conclusions based on the study of one
particular tribe. Therefore, Wiredu’s conception of culture in African
Modernity rests on the fallacy of hasty generalisation. The strength of
inductive conclusions depends on the diversity of the samples. Consequently, in
order to make good conclusions Wiredu’s research was supposed to be broad and
adopt a phenomenological approach not a theoretical armchair research.
6.0.CONCLUSION
To sum up, this
paper has examined Wiredu’s conception of culture in African Modernity. Among
other things it has exposed that culture can be understood in two different
ways. The first way of conceiving culture is by looking at it as social forms
and customary beliefs and practices of a human group. The other way is to
conceive it as social forms and customary beliefs and practices of a human
group but which further depend on the existence of language, knowledge, communication and
interaction as well as the methods of language acquisition. It has been argued
that morality is universal and it is intrinsically obligatory and
unconditional. On the other hand, custom is relative to a particular grouping,
space and time. Modernity is three-dimensional phenomena, which comprises
industrialisation, communication and, commerce and trade. It is modernity,
which is central in Wiredu’s argument on communalism and individualism. Wiredu’s central argument is
that modernity via industrialisation has destroyed the African communal life.
Modernity, according to Wiredu has replaced the fundamental law of morality,
the principle of sympathetic impartiality with mere human sympathy. This in
turn, has led to loose relations among the urban dwellers, to such an extent
that their relations and morality is motivated by the circumstances of
industry. Industrialisation in general, has given birth to “Homo economicus” who is searching for
social connections through material items. A good part of this paper was
therefore an analysis of these claims
and it has been demonstrated that even though Wiredu’s concern on the culture
in African modernity are sound, some of the arguments regarding communalism and
individualism, and above all his conception of culture in an African Modernity
leaves a room for further discussions.
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______“Problems in Africa’s
self-definition in the
contemporary world”
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